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ABSTRACT
This study investigates the effects of institutional structure on the privacy rights regimes
in the United States and the United Kingdom, from 2000-2006. The goal of this research is to
analyze how variation in the institutional arrangements across these two countries allowed for
more or less protection of privacy rights for citizens. Domestic terrorist attacks during the time
period represent a catalyst for changes in police and government surveillance activities. Veto
points literature provides the framework for institutional comparison.
The first part of the research provides a discussion of the historical evolution of privacy
rights in both states, focusing on government and police surveillance and investigations. The
second part of the research, based on veto points theory, compares the institutional arrangements
of the United States and the United Kingdom, and suggests that the number of veto points and
the ideological proximity of veto players have had an effect on the formulation of policy. Laws
governing surveillance, investigations and privacy in the year 2000 provide a benchmark for
analyzing how policies change over time.
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CHAPTER 1: OVERVIEW AND EXPECTATIONS
Introduction
"We need to be keenly aware of the startling advances in the sophistication of
eavesdropping and surveillance technologies with their capacity to easily sweep up and analyze
enormous quantities of information and then mine it for intelligence. And this adds significant
vulnerability to the privacy and freedom of enormous numbers of innocent people at the same
time as the potential power of those technologies grows. Those technologies do have the
potential for shifting the balance of power between the apparatus of the state and the freedom of
the individual in ways that are both subtle and profound." – Al Gore, Speech on Constitutional
Issues, January 16, 2006 (Gore, 2006, pp. 565-566).
Technological breakthroughs in the previous century have enhanced communications
capabilities to the point where information can be transmitted across the world in a matter of
seconds. Data travels across borders and into homes, internet cafes, cell phones, and anywhere
with Wi-Fi capabilities. The last 20 years has seen the birth and maturation of the cell phone
industry, internet service providers, search engines, and the rise of social networking and
blogging. An ever increasing number of satellites has allowed satellite TV, global positioning
systems (GPS), and interactive mapping to develop into mainstream applications. There are
many positive aspects to these technological developments, making life much more convenient
for those able to access the services provided. These same technologies have been used by states
to increase intelligence gathering capabilities, including: tracking personal financial transactions,
recording detailed satellite images of neighborhoods, pinpointing cell phone locations, tapping
phone lines, intercepting emails, collecting and storing video footage of public places, collecting
virtual information through internet browser histories and online profiles, and even using
infrared scanners to detect heat signatures through the walls of private residences (Etzioni, 2007;
Gadzheva, 2008; Hentoff, 2008). Privacy advocates and scholars have raised concerns that some
democratic governments may be using these technological advancements to collect information
at the expense of civil liberties, including the right to privacy.
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The protection of individual privacy is an important facet of a democratic society.
Balancing state power and the rights of individuals is at the very core of democratic theory, and
one which can be applied to the current issue of national security versus individual privacy.
September 11, 2001 forced Western democracies, and the United States in particular, to focus
more closely on internal security concerns. In addition to the U.S., the United Kingdom
experienced a large-scale terrorist attack, the July 7, 2005 bombings, and responded by
increasing domestic security. As the security apparatus expands, there have been policy changes
in privacy protections across the United States and United Kingdom. The expectation is that the
extent of policy change across these two countries will vary given their distinct institutional
structure. Policies created to strengthen domestic intelligence gathering in the wake of these
crises have come under scrutiny by privacy advocates for infringing on individual rights. It is
important to understand how these two democracies created policies to expand their security
apparatuses, and whether the policy making process itself affected the amount of privacy
protections available to their citizens. To do so, it is essential to identify the institutional
variations between the U.S. and U.K., and to understand how these differences affect policy
change with respect to privacy rights. The purpose of this thesis is to determine if the different
institutional arrangements of the United States and the United Kingdom affect the extent of
privacy protection for individuals.
The institutional literature suggests that policy change is a function of the number of veto
points and ideological proximity of the veto players. Veto points literature argues that in most
cases policy change is less likely with a larger number of veto points, and deviations from the
status quo more likely with a smaller number. The literature points out that ideological proximity
and preferences of veto players also affect policy change, and where veto players have
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convergent preferences, policy change is more likely (Crepaz, 2004; Kastner & Rector, 2003;
O'Reilly, 2005; Tsebelis, 2000). As security comes to the fore in the U.S. and U.K., the
expectation is that there will be some convergence of preferences, but that the U.S., with a larger
number of veto points, will have less policy change than the U.K.
Assessing privacy protections will be a complicated task due to the ambiguity
surrounding the concept and development of privacy rights in the U.S. and U.K. Despite the
Fourth Amendment protections against unwarranted search and seizures, the U.S. Constitution
does not specifically outline a right to privacy, and protections rely on legislation and case law.
While the U.K. does not have a written constitution, and privacy protections are also reliant on
legislation and case law, the U.K. is a signatory to the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR), which does specify that individuals have a right to privacy. It is important to note that
this research is not concerned with privacy rights as they relate to medical records, personal
choice issues, such as personal choice, religious affiliations, abortion, or privacy from corporate
marketing, data collection, and tracking. This research is expressly interested in privacy rights
and protections for citizens involved in government or law enforcement agency investigations
and surveillance. There is some overlap, however, between corporate data collection and
surveillance activities when the information gathered from corporate sources is requested by law
enforcement for evidentiary use, and this overlap will require further clarification.
The privacy protection research relies on primary source documents such as bills and
statutes to provide information about what law enforcement powers are authorized by the
government. I analyze the language of the law to identify unclear or underdeveloped concepts
that leave room for interpretation and expansion of government power. Secondary print and
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electronic magazine and newspaper source also provide analysis of law, and report on political
tensions within government agencies regarding their passage.
Expectations
The main underlying assumption here is that an increase in surveillance, investigations,
and intelligence gathering translates into less privacy for citizens, and since the U.S. and U.K.
are democratic countries, the secondary assumption is that they value some level of privacy from
intrusive government activities, as such privacy is important to democratic values of freedom of
speech, expression, and dissent. On the surface, it appears that institutional variations across
countries would result in differing levels of privacy protections. The bicameral presidential
model of government in the U.S. government includes checks and balances that tend to produce
policy stability by reducing the ability of one party to completely control the legislative process.
The parliamentary system in the U.K. is controlled by the majority party in the lower house,
which elects a Prime Minister, and has comparatively fewer checks on executive and legislative
power. Policy changes in response to the terrorist attacks in both countries, and during the ‘War
on Terror’ and the invasion of Iraq, have increased the amount of law enforcement activities
sanctioned by the government, including surveillance and intelligence gathering. This research
posits that the U.K. will be able to push through more legislation increasing government powers
than the U.S. based on the institutional differences mentioned above. Put differently, the checks
and balances inherent in the U.S. government should provide more privacy protection for
citizens since all three branches must approve of new legislation and policies1.
Conducting an analysis of privacy protections assumes that some amount of privacy
exists in these countries, and that it is desirable to the populations. Thus, it is essential to come to
1

The U.S. Supreme Court can rule whether or not laws are Constitutional, but there is significant lag time associated
with the Court’s ability to effect policy change, due to the sometimes lengthy appeals process and/or the refusal of
the Court to grant standing to a particular case.
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an understanding of what privacy means within the context of the liberal democratic traditions of
the United States and the United Kingdom to answer the following questions: how did the
concept of the right to privacy develop? And how has it evolved over time in these two states?
Chapter 2 addresses these questions and discusses the evolution of individual privacy in the U.S.
and U.K. Following the discussion of the concept of privacy, I turn to the theoretical framework
to discern what privacy protections are, and how institutional differences may affect the amount
of protection. These issues are discussed in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 includes the comparison of the
U.S. and U.K. privacy protection regimes and presents the findings of this research. Finally,
Chapter 5 concludes and provides an overview of the analysis of the research.
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CHAPTER 2: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN THE U.S. AND U.K
Privacy in the United States
Defining privacy has also been acknowledged within the fields of sociology, psychology,
philosophy, and political science as a particularly difficult task, deserving of contextual
information about whom and what is the object of privacy. For the purposes of this research, the
relevant population are citizens and resident aliens in the United States and the United Kingdom,
and privacy is defined as “that part of our lives insulated against the communal or public broadly
construed, protected from unwanted intrusion by other, including political authorities, and the
place where, in the last resort, we can clothe ourselves in anonymity” (Peterman, 1993, pp. 218219). Such a concept of privacy is tied to democratic values, and the liberal traditions common to
Western democracies. The fundamental rights to freedom of speech, religion, and expression are
intricately tied to the “freedom of thought, control over one's body, solitude in one's home,
control over information about oneself, freedom from surveillance, protection of one's
reputation, and protection from searches and interrogations” (Solove, 2002, p. 1088). This is
especially true in democratic countries, where citizens have the expectation of privacy in these
regards, and moderate legal protections to ensure it.
Privacy protections in the United States are drawn from two main sources, the Supreme
Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment and legislation enacted by Congress limiting the
government’s ability to conduct surveillance on its citizens. The right to privacy was first
recognized in the early twentieth century by the Supreme Court, and the Court has since
broadened the scope of the Fourth Amendment by reinterpreting unreasonable search and
seizures. Several cases have been central to understanding what the Court has determined is
protected under the Fourth Amendment, and what protections individuals can expect.
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The most well-known definition of privacy in the U.S., and perhaps the simplest, written
by Supreme Court Justice Brandeis, is “the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights
and the right most valued by civilized men” ("Olmstead et al. v. United States", 1928, p. 277
U.S. 471). This dissenting opinion, and Warren and Brandeis’ 1890 article in the Harvard Law
Review, “The Right to Privacy”, were seminal in defining an interest in the right to privacy in
American legal discourse, and provided the impetus necessary for the Court to consider more
comprehensive privacy protections ("Olmstead et al. v. United States", 1928; Warren, 1890).
“Prior to 1890 privacy had never been treated as an independent legal right; whatever
legal protection it had received had been as a consequence of its association with other,
more familiar legal rights – the right to property and its offspring, the laws of nuisance,
trespass, and defamation, or under the rubric of family law and domestic relations”
(Mindle, 1989, pp. 586-587).
If privacy did not exist in its own right, on what legal precedent had Brandeis based his dissent?
Anuj C. Desai argues that “crucial among the precedents on which Brandeis relied was the 1878
case Ex Parte Jackson, the first case in which the Court ruled that the Fourth Amendment
preserved a realm of communications privacy from government intrusion” (Desai, 2007, p. 556).
According to Desai, when the Continental Congress established the United States Postal Service
(USPS), they codified in the charter a right to communications privacy.
“In October 1782, towards the end of the Revolutionary War, the Continental Congress
passed a comprehensive postal ordinance. That law explicitly prohibited postal officials
from opening the mail without ‘an express warrant under the hand of the President of the
Congress of these United States or in time of war, of the Commander in Chief of the
armies of these United States, or of the commanding officer of a separate [sic] army in
these United States, or of the chief executive officer of one of the said states’” (Desai,
2007, pp. 565-566).
This was not a sweeping privacy law, and did not establish a broader right to privacy, but rather
developed over time during the Revolutionary War as a reflection of specific challenges
Colonialists faced when sending communications through the British post (Desai, 2007).
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Protections such as this, however, were influential precursors to more comprehensive privacy
rights established by the Court in the late Nineteenth and early Twentieth century, and espoused
by Brandeis.
Thus, beginning with the Olmstead decision, the Supreme Court began expanding
privacy rights under the Fourth Amendment, especially the landmark 1967 decision in Katz v.
United States ("Katz v. United States", 1967, p. 389 U.S. 347). Since this research focuses
specifically on privacy protections with regard to government surveillance, this chapter examines
the evolution of such protections, and does not include a discussion of privacy rights as they
relate to moral issues such as sexual preference, obscenity, abortion, or domestic relations. The
next section outlines individual privacy protections under the Fourth Amendment, followed by a
discussion of privacy protections under important legislation, such as the Federal Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA), the Stored Communications Act, the Uniting and Strengthening
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of
2001 (USA PATRIOT Act), and the relevant Court decisions concerning these acts.
Privacy Protections Under the Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment also grew out of the experience of the colonists during the
Revolutionary War, as a response to the blanket searches and seizures conducted by British
Officers holding writs of assistance. It establishes:
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized” ("The Constitution of the
United States, Amendment IV", 1791).
This Amendment was not originally drafted to protect the privacy of citizens from the
government. Actually, Mindle argues that the Founders never intended to recognize a right to
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privacy, as such a right “would have damaged that sense of citizenship or civil spirit
indispensable to the integrity and welfare of the political community” (Mindle, 1989, p. 578).
Instead, the Fourth Amendment specifically targeted indiscriminate searches and seizures of the
kind perpetrated by the British before and during the Revolutionary War, and it took the Court
quite a while to establish privacy as right protected by this amendment. However, “in recent
years, protection of privacy has come to be viewed as ‘the principal object of the Fourth
Amendment’” ("Protecting Privacy under the Fourth Amendment", 1981, p. 314). New
interpretations of the Fourth Amendment fundamentally redefined ‘searches’ and ‘persons and
effects’, allowing the Court to augment privacy rights.
The most important cases establishing privacy protections under the Fourth Amendment
are the decisions in Olmstead v. United States, Berger v. New York and Katz v. United States, and
these decisions ultimately are responsible for the shift in interpretation of the Fourth Amendment
("Berger v. New York", 1967, p. 388 U.S. 341; , "Katz v. United States", 1967, p. 389 U.S. 347; ,
"Olmstead et al. v. United States", 1928). Berger v. New York involved the audio surveillance of
attorney Ralph Berger’s office for several months. Berger was suspected of bribery, and the New
York Police bugged his office, eavesdropped on months of his conversations, until they
ultimately had the evidence needed to convict him of bribery. In the Court’s ruling opinion, it
broadened the protections of the Fourth Amendment by ruling that the conversations recorded by
the blanket surveillance were protected as private, that the audio surveillance was considered a
‘search’, and as such, the search parameters were too broad to be Constitutional. Following the
Berger decision, was the Katz v. United States decision, which again widened the scope of
privacy protections.
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Charles Katz was being investigated by the FBI for illegal gambling, and was known to
use a public phone booth to make the suspected illicit phone calls. The FBI argued that since
Katz was using a public booth, and was not making the calls from his own property, the FBI did
not need a warrant to conduct audio surveillance of the phone booth. However, the Court found
that Katz paid for the use of the phone, shut the door, and expected that his conversations were
not being recorded or overheard. “In Katz v. United Sates, the Supreme Court has maintained
that an individual is protected by the Fourth Amendment whenever he or she has a ‘reasonable
expectation of privacy’” ("Protecting Privacy under the Fourth Amendment", 1981, p. 314).
These decisions not only solidified the warrant requirement for government surveillance, but
they also expanded individual privacy rights by disconnecting privacy from property ownership.
“By protecting this privacy interest, the Court enlarged the Fourth Amendment’s protective
scope to encompass governmental intrusions in any private context” ("Protecting Privacy under
the Fourth Amendment", 1981, p. 316). The decoupling is important as it establishes an
individual’s right to privacy even when they are not within their own home, but also when they
are at their office, a public phone booth, or any space where they can expect a reasonable amount
of privacy.
Furthermore, the warrant requirement established by the Fourth Amendment is a
safeguard against unreasonable searches, and the Supreme Court has generally held, with few
exceptions, the need for investigative officers to obtain such a warrant before conducting
searches, intercepting communications, wiretapping phones, or using audio/video surveillance.
“The basic warrant procedure is uncomplicated. To obtain a valid warrant, a law
enforcement officer must demonstrate to a judicial officer through sworn affidavits that
probable cause exists to believe that criminal contraband or evidence will be found at a
particular location” ("Protecting Privacy under the Fourth Amendment", 1981, p. 318).
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Through this process, individuals are supposed to be protected from arbitrary searches, though
there have been exceptions to the warrant requirement, most notably at border crossings, airports,
and in vehicles, or when the search can prevent imminent harm to the suspect, the destruction of
evidence, or bodily harm to innocent bystanders.
These precedents were upheld in the 1972 case United States v. U.S. District Court, also
known as the Keith case, involving warrantless surveillance of defendants involved in plotting
the destruction of government property ("United States v. U.S. District Court", 1972). The Court
“drew a further distinction – one between surveillance related to domestic threats to national
security and surveillance related to foreign threats to national security” (Seamon, 2005, p. 332).
Since the defendants were American citizens, they were still subject to protections outlined under
the Fourth Amendment, including the warrant requirement. This is an important distinction.
Non-U.S. citizens are thus not afforded the same protections under the Fourth Amendment, and
the government can investigate foreign nationals and foreign threats to security without being
subject to the warrant requirement.
There are three important privacy protections established under these landmark Fourth
Amendment cases: 1. searches, seizures, or surveillance of an individual not under arrest and
without probable cause requires that a warrant be obtained from an judicial official ("United
States v. U.S. District Court", 1972); 2. information obtained without a warrant may not
permissible in court if an individual is acting under the assumption of a reasonable expectation of
privacy ("Berger v. New York", 1967; , "Katz v. United States", 1967); and 3. searches include
audio and video surveillance, thermal imaging, or any device “that is not in general public use, to
explore details of a private home that would previously have been unknowable without physical
intrusion” ("Kyllo v. United States", 2001, pp. 3-13). The government has sought exceptions to
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these rights, most notably with regard to investigations of national security issues. Starting with
FISA, and most recently, with the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act, the Terrorist Surveillance
Act, and the Protect America Act, some of these protections have been revised. A further
discussion of these acts and their effect on privacy protections and the Fourth Amendment is
needed.
Privacy Protections and National Security
“Before Congress enacted the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”) in 1978,
presidents beginning with Franklin Roosevelt authorized warrantless electronic surveillance in
the name of national security. They claimed the ‘inherent power’ to do so” through the War
Powers clause (Seamon, 2005, p. 330). Presidents had authorized warrantless surveillance of
individuals suspected of endangering national security, but also surveillance of criminal
activities, dissidents, radicals, or opposition leaders whether the suspects were foreigners, foreign
nationals, or citizens. Congress passed the FISA in response to The Church Committee’s
findings involving the misuse of executive power since the end of World War II, most notably
the Watergate scandal, and the FBI’s Counter Intelligence Program (COINTELPRO), which
conducted intrusive surveillance on civil rights and anti-war activists (Bedan, 2007, p. 429). The
Church Committee recommended that the U.S. government could limit abusive surveillance
behavior by separating foreign and domestic intelligence gathering activities. FISA limited the
scope of warrantless intelligence gathering by reducing the executive branch’s ability to conduct
criminal investigations, and shifting its scope to primarily foreign threats to national security.
“Congress did not deny the President’s inherent power to conduct electronic surveillance
for national security purposes. Instead, Congress took the position that even if the
President had such power, Congress could regulate that power by prescribing reasonable
procedures for its exercise” (Seamon, 2005, p. 336).

12

The procedures require the executive branch to submit surveillance orders to the a special court
for review, demonstrate that the target of the surveillance is “a foreign power or an agent of a
foreign power” and that the location under surveillance “is being used, or is about to be used, by
a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power” (Seamon, 2005, p. 339). These provisions were
sought in order to limit the executive branches ability to conduct warrantless surveillance of
domestic targets, and to force the government to conduct such investigations either under the
FISA or under previously established Fourth Amendment protections. Specifically, “the
definition of ‘agent of a foreign power’ distinguishes ‘United States persons’ from everyone
else…The FISA specially protects the privacy interests of U.S. persons” (Seamon, 2005, p. 340).
The FISA and Fourth Amendment protections for U.S. citizens and resident aliens
remained basically unchanged until 2001. Following the terrorists attacks, serious questions
arose as to how the government failed to detect and prevent the hijackers plot. The Bush
administration and the Congress responded quickly to the crisis with the USA PATRIOT Act,
which changed surveillance capabilities and procedures for law enforcement, including
amendments to the FISA. Some of the powers granted under the PATRIOT Act amend the FISA
by allowing law enforcement officers to gather “foreign intelligence information2”, the ability to
share such information with any Federal officers or agents authorized to receive it, and the ability
for law enforcement officers, and Federal officers and agents to obtain such information
electronically ("USA PATRIOT Act", 2001). The PATRIOT Act also grants the Federal
government broader ability to subpoena personal and business records including internet service,
banking, library, and telecommunications records; broader ability to conduct roving wiretaps on
cell phones and email accounts; broadens authorization of pen registers and trap and trace

2

For the PATRIOT Act definition of foreign intelligence information please see H.R. 3162, Section 203, page 11.
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devices3 in internet communications; and relaxes the provision that FISA authorized surveillance
is conducted strictly for the purpose of gathering foreign intelligence information ("USA
PATRIOT Act", 2001). The PATRIOT Act replaces the FISA requirement stating that executive
branch surveillance be conducted for the primary purpose of investigating foreign threats to
national security, with a much less stringent requirement. The new requirement states only that
surveillance may be conducted under the FISA if a foreign threat to national security is a
significant part of the investigation. Since the government applies for the FISA warrants through
the secret FISA court, the debate over what significance an investigation takes place with little
oversight.
Privacy advocates argue that these new abilities remove the American exception under
the FISA, and that they infringes on privacy rights protected by the Fourth Amendment.
“The PATRIOT Act disrupts the delicate [balance] inherent in our established
surveillance laws, which prior to September 11th provided government with sufficient
lee-way to conduct both criminal and intelligence surveillance while protecting
Americans’ Fourth and First Amendment rights to be free from “unreasonable searches
and seizures” and to exercise freedom of expression” (Rackow, 2002, p. 1653).
The lack of transparency under which the FISA courts operate, and within the executive branch
bureaucracies en masse, has been targeted by privacy advocates as a significant cause for alarm.
Of particular concern are the national security letters (NSLs) issued by the FBI, under the
PATRIOT Act provisions, “which allow investigators to demand records without the approval of
a judge and to prohibit companies or institutions from disclosing the request” (Eggen, 2005, p.
A11). However, the Court has shown that if and when citizens feel their privacy has been
invaded, they have the ability to challenge the government under Fourth Amendment protections.
There are a few important questions to ask concerning the use of NSLs, and other PATRIOT Act

3

For information pertaining to pen registers and trap and trace devices, please see U.S. Code, Title 18, Chapter 119
– Wire and Electronic Communications Interception and Interception of Oral Communications
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powers. Even though the Court has granted Fourth Amendment protections, and the FISA
contains privacy protections for U.S. persons, do executive branch organizations operate within
these parameters? Are there executive branch activities that fall outside the realm of Fourth
Amendment and FISA protections, and what impact do they have on individual privacy? What
are the other government branches doing, if anything, to put a check on such power? These
questions will be taken up at greater length in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4.
Privacy in the United Kingdom
Privacy protections in the U.K evolved originally from a strong recognition of private
property, and the tradition that ‘an Englishman’s home is his castle’. Private property dominated
the English discourse on democratic theory, embodied in the works of Thomas Hobbes, John
Locke, and John Stuart Mill. “By the 1760s and 1770s, moreover, the Court of Common Pleas
was protecting the subject’s castle again the king himself, by striking down general search
warrants and upholding large fine against revenue agents who committed unlawful trespass”
(Seipp, 1983, p. 335). As far as government surveillance is concerned, however, the U.K. has far
less cohesive legal tradition than the United States. The British parliament, despite EU pressure
since the passage of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), has failed to pass
legislation protecting a comprehensive right to individual privacy, and the courts have relied on
legal tradition in cases where privacy rights are challenged. Without parliamentary initiative, the
courts have been reluctant to adopt any privacy standards despite their recognition that such laws
are lacking.
Privacy Protections and British Common Law
Private property laws emerged as an integral part of classical liberal traditions in the
U.K., and can be seen in the writing of famous British theorists such as Thomas Hobbes, John
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Locke, and John Stuart Mill. Private property was held in such a high regard that in some cases,
peering into a neighbor’s windows could be seen as offense against privacy. Englishman sought
rulings by the courts in order to protect themselves from privacy intrusions by neighbors,
passersby, and anyone who saw fit to loiter around their property. One of the main areas of
common law protection was the law against trespassing on another’s land, either by physically
entering without permission, or by peering in through open windows, doors, or otherwise
attempting to gain unauthorized views of private gardens.
“The law of trespass was extended in the last decade of the [19th] century to cover
‘unreasonable’ user of the highway adjoining the plaintiff’s land, an activity that
encompasses observation of the plaintiff’s activities on his own land. The criminal law
supplemented these remedies with longstanding sanctions against peeping Toms and
eavesdroppers as well as new offenses of ‘watching and besetting’ aimed primarily at
trade union picketers” (Seipp, 1983, p. 337).
English common law generally ruled in favor of property owners claiming injuries or damages
from such unauthorized intrusions. An Englishman’s home was opined to be a refuge from the
world, and common law provided legal protections for property owners to enforce this.
In addition to the strong recognition of private property rights, the English courts
eventually recognized a level of communications privacy, both from the government and private
intrusion. In the 18th century, letter interception by the government was widespread, but by the
mid-19th century “as a result of the public outcry, one of the secret offices conducting such work
was disbanded and in the other one, specific warrants from the Secretary of State were
henceforth required” (Seipp, 1983, p. 339). The warrant requirement for opening mail and
reading telegraphs was extended to telecommunications after telephones became widespread.
However, according to the decision in the 1979 decision Malone v. Commissioner of Police of
the Metropolis, although the police had a warrant to tap Mr. Malone’s phone, the warrant
requirement was not totally necessary under English law as “there was no property right in words
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transmitted across telephone lines” (Noone, 1997, p. 144). If this seems contradictory, it may
well be so. Unlike the United States, the British legal system has only upheld a patchwork of
privacy rights, although it recognizes the importance of such rights. The lack of a formalized and
comprehensive privacy rights regime can be attributed to press opposition, a failure of the
legislature to pass a all-inclusive privacy rights bill, and the courts’ unwillingness to legislate
such rights in the courtroom. This has often put British law in opposition to the European
Convention on Human Rights, which it signed as part of it’s acceptance into the European
Union.
British Privacy Protections and the European Convention on Human Rights
The U.K. is a signatory to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which
provides for a level of privacy protection not specifically granted under U.K. law. Article 8
covers the relevant rights protected under the ECHR:
1. “Everyone has the right to respect for his privacy and family life, his home and his
correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except
such as in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the
interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for
the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the
protection of the rights and freedoms of others” ("The European Convention on Human
Rights", 4 November 1950).
After the U.K. became a signatory to the ECHR, scholars and other European states began
demanding a more comprehensive recognition of a right to privacy in the U.K. A provision under
the ECHR allowed any British citizen that felt these rights had been violated the right to appeal
to the European Court of Human Rights. This appeal process places the U.K. in a difficult
position. Without recognizing a comprehensive right to privacy in common law, or through
parliamentary legislation, U.K. citizens fall below the level of protection available to them in the
EU Court. U.K. citizens can, and have, challenged their government’s existing privacy
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protections at the EU Court, but the rulings from the court have no legal standing in the U.K.
Issues such as these put international pressure on the U.K. to bring its policies more in line with
the rest of EU states. “Adjudication of privacy claims under Article 8 of the Convention in these
international tribunals may have the indirect effect of spurring the creation of domestic remedies
to forestall unfavourable world publicity” (Seipp, 1983, p. 353). However, the U.K. firmly
maintains its right to be the final arbiter in legal matters pertaining to its citizens.
Privacy Protections and National Security
The U.K privacy rights regime has less stringent requirements on government
surveillance of citizens, and a broader mandate for law enforcement officials to collect and
analyze individuals’ conversations, correspondence, and digital records, especially if the target is
suspected of criminal activity. The 1998 Data Protection Act provides citizens with the right to
protect, view, and amend personal information collected from third parties, but are exempted
from such protections in the event of a national security or criminal investigation. The
Regulations of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA), passed in 2000, authorizes covert surveillance,
wiretapping, and digital interceptions, in some cases, without a warrant requirement as long as
permission is granted by the Home Secretary. RIPA has come under scrutiny as local
governments have used the Act to obtain information about citizens.
“In 2006, more than 1,000 applications per day were being made to use Ripa powers. The
Act allows councils to authorise surveillance, obtain phone records and details of email
traffic from personal computers (though not their contents) and obtain details of websites
individuals are logging on to” (Rayner, 2008).
Initially, RIPA allowed very few agencies the right to authorize surveillance under its guise.
After 9/11 however, “RIPA was "updated" so that nearly 800 bodies were empowered to go into
the spying business” (Porter, 2009). In addition to RIPA, the U.K. parliament passed a series of
anti-terrorism acts, which further expanded law enforcement capabilities to search and detain
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suspects. The Terrorism Act 2000 and the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, the
Criminal Justice Act 2003, the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, and The Terrorism Act 2006
all authorized significant police powers to detain, search, and interrogate those suspected of
terrorist related activities. In some cases, police are authorized to stop and search individuals
even if the officer has no grounds to suspect them ("The Criminal Justice Act 2003 (c. 44)",
2003).
The U.K. has a history of dealing with terrorist attacks. During the late 1960’s and
1970’s, the IRA conducted a widespread bombing campaign in Northern Ireland and England. In
1988, Pan Am Flight 103 was bombed as it flew over Lockerbie, Scotland, resulting in nearly
300 casualties. As a result, prior to September 11, 2001, the U.K. had anti-terrorism laws
authorizing the surveillance, search, and detention of suspected terrorists. Anti-terrorism laws
overlap specific privacy protections if the suspect is considered a threat to national security.
Some laws allow for unlimited detention of suspected terrorists, the collection of private
information such as photographs and DNA evidence, even without formal criminal charges or
offense ("The Criminal Justice Act 2003 (c. 44)", 2003; , "The Prevention of Terrorism Act
2005", 2005; , "The Terrorism Act 2000 (c. 11)", 2000). An increase in anti-terrorism legislation
and expanding permissible law enforcement behavior will most likely have a negative impact on
privacy protection laws, especially if being suspected of broadly defined terrorism negates
privacy protections citizens would otherwise be privy to. In a system with a singular veto point, a
major terrorist event has the potential to have a substantial legislative impact.
In the U.K., the parliament updates and revises existing legislation when changing
security situations mandate different or increased security measures. Starting with The Terrorism
Act 2000, the U.K. passed a series of terrorism acts, and the changing provisions give insight on
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the debate over civil liberties within the controlling party. Looking at the succession of acts
passed, one would expect the concerns over national security to trump concerns over privacy
closely following terrorist events. Considering the lack of veto points within the system,
parliament should be able to quickly move policies toward creating a more security focused
environment. On the other hand, if concerns over civil liberties become an issue for the
controlling party, it should be reflected in measures easing some of the more intrusive provisions
in the next round of legislation.
Pre-9/11 anti-terrorism legislation in the U.K. was written with the domestic terrorism of
the IRA in mind. The Terrorism Act of 2000 broadly defined terrorism as “the use or threat of
action... is designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public or a section of the
public, and…is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause”
("The Terrorism Act 2000 (c. 11)", 2000, Part I). Suspected terrorists under this act could only be
held for a maximum of 48 hours without being charged, and only persons designated as
constables could rightfully search and seize property from those suspected of terrorism ("The
Terrorism Act 2000 (c. 11)", 2000, Part V). Following the attacks on 9/11, however, the Antiterrorism, Crime and Security Act (ACSA) expanded the power of law enforcement to search
and detain suspects. Whereas previously police would have to show grounds for searching or
detaining a suspected terrorist, under the ACSA “a constable may in the exercise of those powers
stop any person or vehicle and make any search he thinks fit whether or not he has any grounds
for suspecting that the person or vehicle is carrying weapons or dangerous instruments” ("AntiTerrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (c. 24)", 2001, Part 10). In Part 4, law enforcement was
also granted the ability to indefinitely detain an international terrorism suspect without charge.
This controversial provision was challenged in the courts, and has since been repealed, as there
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was no designation between a foreign national or a citizen, and under U.K. law and the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), citizens cannot be detained indefinitely without a trial.
Data Collection, Protection and Surveillance
Governments maintain their own databases of information about citizens and noncitizens, including criminal histories, civil court cases, tax information, traffic citations,
immigration records, and biometric information, such as fingerprints, are maintained by
government agencies. The United States and the EU have also recently considered, or adopted,
measures to fingerprint all incoming foreign visitors and store the information in databases. The
U.S. claims such information is necessary to combat the threat of terrorism, but privacy
advocates argue that there is little proof in the measures effectiveness, and a high chance that the
information could be lost, stolen, tampered with, or otherwise abused.
The U.S. and the U.K. have also been pursuing an increased amount of domestic
surveillance under the pretext of national security and the prevention of terrorism, though the
tactics of the U.S. government are arguably the most publicized. Both countries have begun
watching their citizens by installing vast networks of CCTV cameras, or through less obvious
efforts like sifting through emails, telephone records or internet browsing habits. Technological
development has allowed governments to intercept and tap phone calls, install key stroke logs on
suspected criminals’ computers, track GPS devices or cell phones to locate individuals, use radio
frequency identification (RFID) tags to store retrievable information about individuals, scan heat
signatures through the walls of private residences, and soon there is the possibility that
unmanned drones will conduct warrantless aerial surveillance of major cities (Wise, 2007).
Without a legal apparatus designed to protect the privacy of citizens, these technologies could

21

easily be abused. Accompanied by any radical shifts in government power, the implications are
frighteningly dystopian.
Sometimes citizens are apprised of security efforts, such as in the United Kingdom,
where the existence of a countrywide video surveillance program has been touted by the
government as a crime deterrent. "There are an estimated 4.2 million CCTV cameras in Britain",
some with interactive capabilities, which is roughly equal to 14.5 people per camera based on
projected population figures for July 2008 ("CIA World FactBook: United Kingdom", 2008; ,
"'Talking' CCTV scolds offenders", 2007). While the surveillance is overt, and people seem to be
generally accepting of the presence of CCTV, has it altered their right to privacy? Or is privacy,
as some have suggested, not a right but a good possessed by individuals within their specific
socio-cultural framework, and tradable as such for other goods? In which case, the British are
simply trading their privacy for increased security proxied by the presence of CCTV. However,
the mere knowledge that someone is watching has the ability to alter an individual’s behavior.
Pervasive, systematic monitoring of citizen emails, phone calls, reading habits, and political
opinions can have a chilling effect on public discourse, especially if the opinions are perceived to
be anti-government or anti-establishment. This type of alteration could limit freedoms otherwise
expected under democratic government, such as free expression, religion, and political opinions.
Furthermore, if the goals of surveillance became ambiguous or blurred, there is certainly a risk
that the government will begin to abuse its powers much more radically. In classic dystopian
visions, it is when the government begins to abuse the power of surveillance that dissent, protest,
and disagreeing with the government start to be monitored, or worse, punished. Classic
American examples include McCarthyism and J. Edgar Hoover’s notorious reign over the FBI
during the Cold War. Suspected Communists were questioned, harassed, followed and often
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times suffered more than just personal humiliation or insult. These historical events should serve
as a reminder that allowing the government too much leeway into what should be private
thoughts, opinions, and beliefs can have devastating effects on a democratic society.
Today, the breadth of the U.S. government’s domestic spying program since 9/11 is now
coming to light as new information is leaked to the press about warrantless wiretapping, the
government’s collusion with the telecommunications industry to obtain private records, and the
surreptitious no-fly lists. The New York Times, Wall Street Journal and the Washington Post
have all reported on aspects of the illegal wiretapping program, though the complete picture is
still considered classified for national security reasons. What was once the Total Information
Awareness program, a data mining project conducted at the Pentagon, is now a classified
program, which sifts through vast databases of personal information looking for “suspicious
patterns” (Gorman, 2008). The real extent of the threat to American’s privacy rights is hidden, as
long as the information about such programs remains secretive. Appropriate channels for citizens
to find redress by such invasions of their privacy is less than obvious, and their ability to
understand what information about themselves is collected, for what purposes, and by whom, is
relatively non-existent.
Privacy Protections and Electronic Information
The government is not the only entity collecting, storing, and sifting through personal
information. Corporations collect, buy, sell, and trade personal information they accumulate
through transactions with consumers at all levels. Signing up for newsletters, magazines, credit
cards, newspapers, special offers, contests, or general information allows a company to collect,
store, and later sell individual’s information. Most retail and services companies have special
customer incentives to release personal information, such as access to special discounts, advance
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sales notifications, and generally cheaper goods and services. Lengthy and highly legalistic
privacy policy notifications accompany such registration, and oftentimes the consumer has little
awareness that their information will be stored, shared, sold, or traded, and they are rarely
informed to whom such information is sold. As a result, canceling one subscription does not
necessarily negate the flow of information between the affiliated parties who have already
purchased or received it.
Information is also collected through the internet, where online companies compile
information about your purchase history, search terms, browsing habits, and personal tastes.
Search engines like Google, Yahoo, and MSN maintain user search histories for over a year
before anonymizing the data ("Search Engines Defend Your Privacy (To Target You Better)",
2007). Meaning every search conducted is indexed and personally identifiable. “In April [2007],
Google launched its Web History service, which monitors all the sites someone visits if they use
the Google toolbar” ("Search Engines Defend Your Privacy (To Target You Better)", 2007). This
information is used to create behavioral profiles of users in order to target advertising or products
at the individual level. Where privacy advocates find the most fault is that these profiles are
maintained over a long period of time, and the companies reserve the right to use them how they
see fit, even supplying them to the government upon request. Google, Microsoft’s MSN, Yahoo
and AOL received subpoenas for a random sampling of millions of internet addresses cataloged
in their databases, as well as for records for potentially billions of searches made over a oneweek period. Only Google refused to comply (Godoy, 2006). Google cited privacy concerns for
its users in its challenge of the subpoena. Privacy advocates applaud Google for resisting, but
note that the information is still collected and maintained, which should be considered.
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While internet privacy remains a huge concern, a more pervasive type of technology
raises questions about corporate privacy standards. Radio Frequency Identification tags (RFID)
“consists of a small integrated circuit attached to a tiny radio antenna, which can receive and
transmit a radio signal” (van den Hoven, 2006). RFID tags can be embedded in just about
anything, from clothing, personal accessories, ID badges, credit cards, passports, electronics,
vehicles, animals, and even people.
“RFID works by using a tag to transmit the identity and other properties of anything to

which it is attached to a reader via radio frequency signals, allowing further information
to be accessed in a computer database. This overcomes most physical barriers and can be
accomplished almost invisibly” (McKee, 2006).
Useful applications for this technology abound – tracking and controlling manufacturing and
supply chain logistics to minimize losses and theft, in-store theft prevention, tagging of wildlife
for research, domestic animal tagging, etc. However, most items containing tags are not labeled
as such. Consumers may be unaware that they are purchasing RFID tagged items, and may not
be told if and when such items have transmitted information about the purchase. In the near
future RFID “will be embedded in virtually everything you buy, wear, drive and read, allowing
retailers and law enforcement to track consumer items - and, by extension, consumers - wherever
they go, from a distance” (Lewan, 2008). Once purchases are linked to credit card or banking
information, corporations then have the ability to identify purchasers and track consumers based
on the products they buy. Walking into retail space becomes less than anonymous as RFID tags
embedded in clothing, accessories, wallets, and credit cards transmit information about what an
individual has purchased previously, what they are wearing, and what they are carrying. This
kind of information could be used to ease the flow of transactions, but this “commodification of
personal information can also have negative results for certain low-volume or otherwise
undesirable customers. It might lead businesses to single out customers in order to discourage
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their patronage” (Schwartz, 2004). If a consumer was felt this behavior was invading their
privacy, would there be a way to ‘opt-out’ of participating in such scans? If not, will products
containing RFID tags be properly labeled, will the tags be identifiable and removable? Such
issues should be considered as this technology becomes more prevalent.
There are also voluntary methods of storing personal information using RFID technology.
Schwartz (2004) identifies VeriChip and wOznet as two such technologies, identification devices
that store, track, and monitor persons and personal information. The VeriChip is an implantable
device that “stores six lines of text, which function as a personal ID number, and emits a 125kilohertz radio signal to a special receiver that can read the text” (Schwartz, 2004). The
accessible database holds personal information like age, name, address, medical history, and
could potentially be used as a verification system for banking, financial transactions, passports,
and travel.
Surveillance Society?
“My anxiety is that we don’t sleepwalk into a surveillance society where much more
information is collected about people, accessible to far more people shared across many
more boundaries than British society would feel comfortable with.." – Richard Thomas,
Information Commission, United Kingdom (Ford, 2004, p. 1)
As Richard Thomas fears, it is entirely possible for both the US and UK to sleepwalk into
a surveillance society, if they have not already. This reasonably assumes that liberal democratic
societies value individual liberty over security to a certain extent, and that a true surveillance
society would violate those fundamental values. Maintaining individual privacy is key to
maintaining the ability of individuals to choose their own religion, hold minority political views,
express unpopular opinions, and participate in activities outside mainstream society.
“Government protection of privacy rights is a measure of society’s commitment to liberty”
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however, “the existence of political community requires the relinquishment of certain rights,
prerogatives, and freedoms” (Krotoszynski, 1990, p. 1398). Finding a balance between these
opposing forces has been the bedrock of liberal democratic societies. Leaning too heavily in
favor of government power and control over the individual verges on tyranny, and leaves the
government room to commit abuses of its power, which democratic societies have sought to
avoid.
Government surveillance is only one facet of the complex issue of individual privacy.
Technological advances in the internet, the proliferation of online purchasing, and RFID tags
have allowed corporations to collect and store a vast amount of consumer data quietly, and the
protection and uses of such data are often less than transparent. Every business that collects
personal information has a privacy policy where they outline what information they collect, who
they distribute it to, and generally provide a section where an individual can decide whether or
not they wish to have their information shared. They are hardly ever decipherable without a legal
degree, written in obtuse language, and tend to be unnecessarily long and complicated.
Consumers’ ability to read and understand these policies are limited at best, leaving corporations
room to collect, store, and distribute more information than consumers may be aware. Do these
states acknowledge the potential for abuse from corporations, and what protections are available
for citizens under their laws? The current trend in both states is that government is asking for
increased access to consumer information, and in the case of internet service providers (ISPs),
increased retention of personal digital records including search terms, purchase histories, and
emails. Since governments are demanding help from corporations to track individuals, it would
be reasonable to assume that they are benefiting from the increased information gathering of
corporations.
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As far as privacy rights are concerned in the digital age, carefully constructed data
management and security, qualified and competent oversight, and a transparent surveillance
system are necessary to keep abuses of power in check. Do either the U.S. or the U.K. present a
clear and reasoned acknowledgement of the dangers of abusing personal information, and are
there protections against invasion of privacy for citizens? Do they consider the pace at which
technological development will alter the ease at which such information is collected, and what do
they intend to do to protect individual privacy rights? It is not to suggest that technological
advancements should in any way be shunned or avoided, and technology cannot be blamed for
the harm perpetrated in its name. However, thinking about the future requires an understanding
of how technology is progressing, and how to deal with the challenges new systems will present
to existing legislatures. Can these states adapt to such changes in technology in a timely and
appropriate manner, or will technological advancements outstrip the ability of the government to
successfully keep up?
The goal of this thesis is to compare the privacy protection regimes in the United States
and the United Kingdom in order to explore the above questions. While both states are
democratic, there are many differences between both government structure and institutional
arrangements, and these variations may explain important differences in the manner in which
privacy policies are implemented.
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CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Veto Points Literature
Before 2000, the U.S. had been expanding the privacy rights regime and incorporating
technological developments into existing views regarding what information and actions should
be protected under existing laws. The U.K., albeit slowly, had advanced a more limited privacy
rights agenda, although it was starting to move more in line with the European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR). After the attacks on September 11, 2001, however, there was a dramatic
shift in attitudes about personal privacy in both states. Safety and the prevention of violence
became the focal point of national discourse, and the security apparatus of the state was given
precedence. In this thesis I examine the institutional determinants of individual privacy
protection policy in the U.S. and the U.K. In other words, is there a relationship between the
institutional structure and privacy protection? How do the institutional arrangements shape the
way privacy policies are formed and implemented? Using the events of September 11 as a
starting point, this thesis analyzes how the institutional structure of the U.S. or the U.K. affected
the levels of privacy protection available for citizens.
The veto points literature offers a framework through which to analyze how institutional
structure affects policy-making. The literature defines a veto point as an institution that can
affect the decision making process. O’Reilly finds that “a more fragmented state has more veto
points within it, which increases the difficulty of altering levels of” policy change (O'Reilly,
2005, p. 653). Additionally, the literature identifies a veto player as an actor or collective actor
who can affect the decision making process. “Generally, the literature of veto players asserts that
particular constitutional configurations shape aggregate policy outcomes” (Minnich, 2005, p.
304). Tsebelis identifies two dimensions that affect policy changes, the number of veto points
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and players, and the ideological proximity of veto players (Tsebelis, 1995, 1999, 2000).
Institutional arrangements such as parliamentary or presidential systems, unicameral or
bicameral houses, federalism, and partisan politics contribute to how policy is created, altered,
compromised, rejected, or passed. To begin,
“Fundamental to the theory of veto points is that, the more of them that exist, the more
difficult it is to change policy, or in Tsebelis’s (1999) useful definition, ‘a veto player is
an individual or collective actor whose agreement is necessary for a change of the status
quo’” (Crepaz, 2004, p. 261).
The more veto points in a system decrease the likelihood that a state can engage in dramatic
policy reversals, or put differently “the more power is diffused among many actors, the more
difficult it should be to affect policy change” (Crepaz, 2004, p. 261). Henisz and Mansfield
examine the effect that fragmentation, measured by the number of veto points present in a
country, has on commercial openness. They argue that “to the extent that the preferences of
actors with veto power differ, institutional structures with more veto points limit the range of
feasible trade policy choices” (Henisz, 2006, p. 191). They find that “holding macroeconomic
conditions constant, the trade regime changes less within democracies as the number of veto
points increases” (Henisz, 2006, p. 208). O’Reilly also analyzes the effects of veto points on
international trade policy, specifically tariffs, and “the findings here suggest that fragmentation
may have a considerable effect on the abilities of states to cooperate with each other in the issue
area of foreign economic policy” (O'Reilly, 2005, pp. 667-668). These studies support the idea
that policy changes will be affected by the institutional structure of a state.
The U.S. is a federal, constitutional, and presidential system, and the power of
government is decentralized so that no one branch or party can dictate policy for the entire
nation. In the U.S., veto points are identified as the both houses of Congress, the President, and
the Supreme Court, and the veto players as the Democratic and Republican parties. Ultimately,
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the U.S. president’s veto power can be overridden by a two-thirds majority in the Congress, but
it’s a difficult majority to obtain and allows the president’s veto to remain effective. The
constitutional system of checks and balances in the U.S. implies that there will be more oversight
in the policy making process than there would be in the parliamentary system as two branches of
government must approve of legislation before it can become binding law, and the Supreme
Court is the final arbiter if and when such laws are challenged. Each branch of government
potentially has veto power over the next, creating a system where the branches essentially
compete for power with each other, thereby reducing the chance that one branch will be able to
completely control the government.
On the other hand, the U.K. is a unitary, parliamentary system, with a highly centralized
power structure. The party with the overall majority in elections forms a government, a cabinet,
and selects a party member to the position of Prime Minister.
“The British Parliament and its mechanism of fusion between executive and legislative
power and parliamentary systems with single-member district electoral systems in
general constitute only one veto point, because the prime minister emerges out of the
majority party in Parliament reducing institutional competition” (Crepaz, 2004, p. 261).
Policy is created according to the party’s goals, and opposition parties challenge those goals in
open debate. Thus, as long as the controlling party wins an absolute majority and does not have
to form a coalition government, it can create and implement policies without the support of the
opposition parties, offering only one check on legislative power. There are a number of informal
veto players in the U.K., however. Since the Prime Minister is selected by the majority party,
(s)he depends on the support of the party, and if (s)he does not conform to the party’s view a
vote of no confidence can remove the Prime Minister from power. In addition, while the
opposition party and the House of Lords hold very little power to stop legislation from being
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passed, their dissenting opinions are signals to the public that certain courses of action are not
unanimously approved.
Even taking informal veto players into context, the U.K. still has comparatively fewer
veto points and players than the U.S., and I would expect that the British government should be
able to more quickly create and change policies in response to the new security environment, and
could be prone to changes in privacy policy due to less constraints on power. In other words, a
larger (smaller) number of veto points and veto players would be associated with less (greater)
policy change in response to the changing security environment after 9/11.
However, in addition to analyzing how fragmentation influences policy choices, the
partisan preferences of the actors involved in policy making should be taken into account. The
institutional literature is also concerned with the ideological identification of the different veto
players, and “as the ideological distance among veto players increases, policy stability increases”
(Tsebelis, 2000, p. 448). If veto points are controlled by the different political parties (veto
players), the theory predicts policy stability, as changes to the status quo become harder to
obtain. However, when the veto points are controlled by partisan players with similar interests
“there is a condition of congruence among the institutions, and the relevant veto player is the
party that controls the institutions” (O'Reilly, 2005, p. 657). Thus, the effective number of veto
players can vary as the majority in the houses of Congress and control of the executive branch
vary after elections. Hammond, finds that “as a general rule, then, policy choices by a system
must be seen as the product of an interaction between the policy-making rules and the
preferences of the actors in the system” (Krause, 2003, p. 102). Even if the veto players have
different partisan identities, it doesn’t necessarily mean their preferences will automatically
diverge. If there is widespread support for a particular policy outcome, i.e. increased security
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after the events of 9/11, policy preferences may converge, despite the number of veto players.
Thus, when attempting to analyze the affect of institutional structure on privacy protection, this
research must take into account not only the institutional veto points, but also the preferences of
the actors involved in the policy-making process.
“Institutional veto players are usually determined in the constitution of a country, and
while partisan veto players can change number, the overall picture is one of relative
stability. For example, in the UK there is always one veto player, in the United States
always three (although their ideological distance from each other may vary)” (Tsebelis,
2000, p. 469).
However, some findings have shown that the preferences of actors in presidential and
parliamentarian systems can be predicted as similar, depending upon the alignment of veto
points.
“Instead, differences in policy stability between two different kinds of systems depend on
the interaction between the number of veto points and the distribution of preferences…of
the elected officials populating the veto points in the two kinds of systems. In fact, it was
demonstrated that for some preference profiles presidential and parliamentary systems
should be expected to select similar policies and exhibit similar patterns of policy change,
despite the systems’ institutional differences” (Krause, 2003, p. 76).
This is not to say that presidential and parliamentary systems will always behave in the same
way, but that there are certain ‘preference profiles’ that will allow these systems to behave in the
same manner. Policy choices are made by actors with differing preferences, and usually result in
compromises. A preference profile is the set of policy choices a particular actor will be willing to
accept (Krause, 2003). Similar ideological backgrounds, such as party affiliations, identify what
an actor’s preference profile will generally be. The colored sections of the graphic below
represent the varying policy compromises each of the actors would be willing to accept. Figure 1
represents actors with farther distance between their policy preferences than the actors in Figure
2.

33

Figure 1: Policy outcomes, dissimilar ideological preferences4

Figure 2: Policy outcome, similar ideological preferences

As actors’ policy preferences converge, the set of policy outcomes they would be willing to
accept grows, and the possibility of policy change increases. As actors’ preferences diverge, the
set of acceptable policy outcomes shrinks, translating into increased policy stability, in most
cases.

4

Figures 1 and 2 adapted from Tsebelis (1999).
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Therefore, despite the fact that the U.S. government has a system of checks and balances,
due to a convergence of veto player preferences following 9/11, the Bush administration was
able to push through a significant amount of legislation governing surveillance and intelligence
gathering laws, and amass power in the presidential office, essentially circumventing oversight
by keeping surveillance programs secretive and under bureaucratic control. Furthermore, when
Congress eventually demanded information about surveillance programs, the Bush
administration claimed expanded powers under the War Powers clause. Oversight, checks and
balances, and restraints on power only function properly if policies and laws are created within
the established policy-making system. Circumventing the veto points essentially negates their
effect.
The expectation is that when the veto players with similar policy preferences or
ideological convergence, there is a greater potential for policy change, and specific to this
research, a greater possibility of change in privacy protections in response to security threats.
With this in mind, the policy change in the U.S. and U.K may be more similar than different as
both countries experience periods of time where veto players have closer proximity. During the
time period from 2000 until the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the U.K. experienced a strong preference
convergence due to popularity of the Blair administration and the Labor Party. In the U.S.,
following the attacks on 9/11 until after the 2004 elections, there is also a strong preference
convergence. Both countries should be able to accomplish desired policy changes with little
resistance during these time periods, as veto players are ideologically aligned. If policy
preferences of these administrations include enhancing law enforcement capabilities to enhance
security domestically, and thereby reduce privacy rights, then it is expected that these goals will
be accomplished.
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A strong argument could be made that any sweeping policy changes during the time
period could be attributed to partisan politics in the U.S. From the 2002 to the 2006 election
cycles, Republicans held majorities in both houses of Congress and the presidency. During that
period, it is entirely possible that partisan politics could account for policy choices, although this
is still consistent with Krause’s argument that the distribution of preferences among actors
determines policy outcomes. Since these U.S. institutional veto points are controlled by a single
party, it would be expected to act similarly to a parliamentary system, despite institutional
variations. Interestingly, the most widespread change to government intelligence gathering and
law enforcement activity in the U.S. is the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001. The PATRIOT Act
expanded the government’s surveillance and intelligence gathering powers by augmenting
existing laws, and passed an evenly divided Senate with an overwhelming majority of 96-1, and
the House, with a modest Republican majority, passed the bill 356-66. While partisan politics
cannot account for this, the overwhelming support the PATRIOT Act received could be
attributed to the “the fog of uncertainty, emotions such as urgency and visceral fear, and the
tendency of legislators and the public to ‘rally ‘round the flag’” after 9/11 (Vermeule, 2008, p.
1155). A surge in nationalism and the ‘rally’ effect would also produce a convergence of player
preferences, and explain the policy outcomes regardless of ideological affiliations.
Research Design
The goal of this research is to analyze how variation in the institutional arrangements
across the U.S. and U.K. allowed for more or less protection of privacy rights for citizens. The
veto points literature provides the framework for institutional comparison, and suggests that the
number of veto points and ideological proximity of veto players have an effect on the
formulation of policy. This leaves two important questions about measuring policy change. 1.
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How to measure which country has more privacy protections for its citizens?, and 2. How to
measure more (or less) privacy protection for its citizens over time? In order to answer the first
question, it is necessary to devise a reasonably consistent and objective system to catalog the
existing privacy protections in each country at a specified time. Subsequently, a later date must
be set in order to measure if and how the protections have changed. For the purposes of this
thesis, the time period over which changes in privacy protections are to be estimated is from the
year 2000-2006.
Privacy is an ambiguous term, and laws governing privacy have situational components,
therefore I conduct a qualitative study to examine what protections exist under the laws of the
country to protect citizens from intrusive searches, seizures, and surveillance. The government
regulates the investigation of suspected criminal activity, terrorist activity, and espionage, and
provides guidelines for law enforcement organizations to follow when they conduct
investigations and authorize surveillance activities. Comparing qualitatively across countries is
appropriate here since the countries treat similar investigations differently, and different levels of
surveillance are authorized based on the type of investigation. For example, the investigation of
criminal activity has an extra component in the U.K., as some crimes are considered regular
criminal activity and some are considered serious criminal activity, a designation reserved for
crimes like narcotics or human trafficking and homicide.
The comparative case study will analyze the activities authorized by the government as
they pertain to privacy protections, and list the relevant laws. Two tables provide a listing of the
relevant legislation dealing with law enforcement capabilities and privacy protections. Table 1
provides the relevant legislation up to 2000, and Table 2 from 2001 to 2006. A discussion of the
specific laws and procedures follows each set of tables, so an overall view of the laws regulating
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law enforcement agencies’ capabilities in each country can be measured. By discussing each
aspect of these laws independently, privacy protections can be inferred from the presence
(absence) of expansions in law enforcement capabilities. The research can then determine if there
has been an increase or decrease in privacy protections based upon this assessment.
Searches, seizures and surveillance are regulated by a complex system of laws, therefore,
it is possible for the activities sanctioned by the government to broaden in one area, such as
wiretapping, but contract in another, such as email interception. It would be difficult to
objectively determine if the expansion of government power in one area should be considered
more intrusive than expansion in another. For example, assume that use of closed-circuit
television cameras (CCTV) in public areas expands and that wiretapping laws become less strict.
It is impossible to gauge which action causes a loss of more privacy, and that type of evaluation
may not even be desirable. Where one individual would find increased audio surveillance more
intrusive, another may determine that video surveillance is more so. However, it is reasonable to
assume that since government powers of surveillance increase in both situations, that there is a
net loss to privacy.
Once changes in privacy protections over time have been determined, it is then possible
to evaluate if the variation in institutional arrangement and the ideological proximity of veto
players have affected policy outcomes. Government transparency, or the lack thereof, creates a
certain amount of difficulty in truly establishing a measure of privacy protection. Programs that
operate in secrecy or without oversight may infringe on privacy rights otherwise afforded to
citizens, and if possible, should be included in the overall analysis. Where possible, such
programs are discussed.
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CHAPTER 4: COMPARATIVE CASE STUDIES AND RESULTS
Surveillance, Data Protection and Law Enforcement Regulations
Technological developments in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s began transforming the
surveillance landscape. Personal computers, the internet, and the widespread use of cell phones
increased information sharing capacities for individuals and governments alike. Technological
advances in communications technology made it easier to share information across great
distances rapidly and cheaply, and the internet allowed these activities to be anonymous
information exchanges. Such developments also precipitated an increased capacity to record and
retain information, and created a “broader network of surveillance activities that now assumes a
remarkable array of forms, including sensors, bureaucratic documentation, x-rays, satellites, and
computerized databases” (Haggerty, 2005, p. 170). Closed-circuit TV (CCTV) security systems
monitor public places, businesses, roadways, and residential areas 24 hours a day, some have
facial recognition technology, internet traffic and emails can be monitored by law enforcement
agencies, and sophisticated databases have been built to track DNA, fingerprints, and spending
and travel patterns. How this information is gathered, processed and used is governed by a
complicated series of statutes, laws, and policies in both the U.S. and U.K.
Tables 1 and 2 in the following section provide lists of the major laws governing these
surveillance activities in the U.S. and U.K. A discussion of the laws follows, including the de
facto range of search, seizure, and surveillance activities the governments were participating in
both inside and outside the scope of the legislation. For example, while a warrant is legally
required in order to conduct covert interception of communications, the U.S. and U.K. were
conducting communications intercept activities in the 1990’s through controversial programs
such as ECHELON (Bedan, 2007). The ECHELON program was a joint effort between the U.S.,
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U.K., and other countries, to actively intercept satellite communications signals in order to gather
intelligence about national security threats. ECHELON works by capturing communications
signals and combing through the data for keywords that could be consistent with criminal or
terrorist activity (Wallace, 2000). Programs like ECHELON, which operate secretly and with
little noticeable impact on the general public, complicate the measurement of privacy protections
because they conduct their activities on such a large scale and in the classified realm of national
security. Classified programs complicate measurement on two levels. The first being that the
programs are not transparent, and there is no way to gauge if they are breaking existing privacy
laws if their actions are not documented or available for oversight. Secondly, the scope of such
programs is often unknown. Nonetheless, it has been rumored that the capabilities of ECHELON
include collecting “as many as 3 billion communications a day, and sift[ing] through 90% of all
Internet traffic” (Nabbali, 2004, p. 92). Even if such estimates cannot be independently verified
due to the classified nature of the program, they cannot be completely ignored. However, the aim
of this research is not to examine the full implementation of privacy protection protocols, but
rather to discuss policy changes over time. Where it is appropriate, classified programs are
discussed, despite the uncertainty surrounding their capabilities, scope, and legality.
Privacy Protections and Government Regulations in 2000
Table 1 provides a list of the laws governing surveillance, data protection, and law
enforcement activities up to and including the year 2000 in the U.S. and U.K. These statutes
provide the standards which law enforcement and government agencies must adhere to during
investigations, and through their limits, define the areas where citizens can expect their privacy
to be protected. By examining these laws and then comparing any changes over time, it becomes
possible to gauge if the amount of personal information, actions, and communications the
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government has access to increases or decreases. For example, the U.S. Cable Communications
Privacy Act of 1986 (CCPA) states that cable companies cannot divulge consumers’ personal
information without
“a court order only if…(1) such entity offers clear and convincing evidence that the
subject of the information is reasonably suspected of engaging in criminal activity and
that the information sought would be material evidence in the case; and (2) the subject of
the information is afforded the opportunity to appear and contest such entity’s claim”
("Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 (Cable Act)", 1986).
If a law passed that does not require the requesting agency to provide evidence that the subject is
suspected of criminal activity in order to obtain a court order, or the agency can access the
information without a court order, it is reasonable to assume that privacy protections have
decreased.
Table 1: Laws governing surveillance and privacy to 2000
United States
United Kingdom
Federal Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)
Privacy Protection Act of 1980 (PPA)
Data Protection Act of 1998
Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 (CCPA)
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA)
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986
The Terrorism Act 2000
(ECPA)
Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988 (VPPA)
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of
1994 (CALEA)

Two major pieces of legislation govern law enforcement activities in the United States in
2000, the Fourth Amendment and the Federal Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). Fourth
Amendment protections have been recorded into the U.S. Code under Title 18: Crimes and
Criminal Procedures, Parts I and II, and Title 47: Interception of Digital and Other
Communications. U.S. Code, under these sections, state that only authorized government agents
or law enforcement agencies with a court order (or warrant) may intercept oral or electronic
communications, install wiretaps, pen registers, and/or trap and trace devices, access stored
communications data, and access personal information from telecommunications providers. A
specific person has to be identified in order for a warrant to be issued, and specific conversations
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are targeted. The only exception to these requirements is if the authorized government agent or
law enforcement agency is conducting these activities under FISA provisions. FISA allows for
warrantless searches, seizures, and communications interceptions when the subject is a foreign
power, but does require a FISA court order in order to conduct such activities on a U.S. person
("The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act", 1978). Neither law enforcement nor authorized
government agents can intercept the communications of or surveil U.S. persons without a court
order or warrant. Law enforcement agencies can conduct legal search and seizures if probable
cause can be established, such as searching the car of a person who fails a sobriety test for more
drugs or alcohol. The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 (CCPA) and the Video Privacy
Protection Act of 1988 (VPPA) protect consumers from having their personal information
divulged to any requesting parties without a court order. For example, cable providers and video
rental outlets cannot divulge rental or subscription preferences, histories, or records to third
parties without a court order, and when requesting a court order, the law enforcement agency
must submit evidence to the court that the information sought is relevant to suspected criminal
activities ("Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 (Cable Act)", 1986; , "Video Privacy
Protection Act", 1988).
Another piece of legislation with implications for privacy protections is the
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (CALEA), which requires “that
digitally switched telephone networks be designed and built with wiretap capabilities and that
service providers assist [Law Enforcement Agencies] in obtaining the desired surveillance”
(Guhl, 2008, p. 110). Part of the provisions of CALEA is that neither the targeted party nor the
telecom provider should be aware of surveillance conducted on the line. These backdoors built
into the digital system were to allow law enforcement agencies easy access to all forms of
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communication if the need to access them arose (Guhl, 2008). These built in protocols are
worrisome because of their anonymity. If neither the provider nor the subject is able to detect the
surveillance, the burden of trust is on law enforcement agencies not to misuse the technology.
While a warrant is required for law enforcement agencies to access the backdoors, and misuse of
the technology clearly falls under implementation of the law, it is still important to note the
possibility exists for abuse of the system.
The above laws state that the government cannot conduct domestic surveillance or
investigations without obtaining a warrant, either through a traditional court, or through the FISA
court. However, as Bedan points out “U.S. Constitutional law has always recognized a
distinction between intelligence gathering and intelligence sharing. The central difference
between the two is that intelligence gathering…is typically limited by statutory and
constitutional requirements, where intelligence sharing typically is not” (Bedan, 2007, p. 441).
This difference is what makes programs such as ECHELON disturbing. Any of the other
countries participating in the program could conceivably conduct investigations of U.S. citizens
and voluntarily turn the information over to U.S. authorities without being subject to Fourth
Amendment or FISA requirements. Since ECHELON was a classified program conducted by the
National Security Agency (NSA) with little or no public oversight, the extent of such
information sharing activities is not known. However, does circumventing Fourth Amendment
and FISA provisions effectively negate their ability to protect the privacy rights of citizens? The
answer is not always. U.S. courts are still afforded the opportunity to determine whether or not
the evidence obtained through such methods is admissible in court, and offer the subjects of such
surveillance the opportunity to argue against the permissibility of such evidence.
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Privacy protections are far less obvious in the U.S. concerning CCTV camera operation.
There is surprisingly little mentioned in U.S. federal law about CCTV camera usage, regulations,
or requirements, other than laws against video voyeurism and covert audio capabilities. CCTV
cameras capturing sound are subject to U.S. wiretap laws, and unauthorized recordings are illegal
based on U.S. Code, Title 18:
“any person who – intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other
person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic communication;
(b) intentionally uses, endeavors to use, or procures any other person to use or endeavor
to use any electronic, mechanical, or other device to intercept any oral communication
when—(i) such device is affixed to, or otherwise transmits a signal through, a wire, cable,
or other like connection used in wire communication…shall be punished as provided in
subsection (4) or shall be subject to suit as provided in subsection (5)” ("U.S.C. Title 18,
Part I, Chapter 119").
In another section of Title 18, the government makes illegal any action by a person “to capture
an image of a private area of an individual without their consent, and knowingly does so under
circumstances in which the individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy” ("U.S.C. Title 18,
Part I, Chapter 88"). Beyond these two statutes, there are no regulations governing the
implementation of CCTV cameras at the federal level. This is particularly problematic as access
to CCTV technologies reaches the mainstream, and video capture technology becomes more
prevalent.
In the U.K., the warrant requirements under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act
of 2000 (RIPA) specifiy that
“an interception warrant must name or describe either— (a) one person as the
interception subject; or (b) a single set of premises as the premises in relation to which
the interception to which the warrant relates is to take place” ("Regulation of
Investigatory Powers Act", 2000).
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By identifying a location or a set of locations, as viable subjects, RIPA authorizes surveillance of
all persons communicating from those places, which could include monitoring or recording the
conversations of innocent people. In addition, RIPA warrants
“shall be taken to include—(a) all such conduct (including the interception of
communications not identified by the warrant) as it is necessary to undertake in order to
do what is expressly authorised or required by the warrant; (b) conduct for obtaining
related communications data” ("Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act", 2000, emphasis
added).
Unlike U.S. warrant requirements, which state specific conversations must be targeted, RIPA
expands the interception to include even those communications not targeted by the warrant.
Furthermore, “related communications data” is not clarified, leaving the warrant open to
intercept an indefinite amount of information. Another section of RIPA requires that if
intercepted communications are found to be password protected or encrypted, internet service
providers and/or the subject of the investigation must provide password and decryption
information.
“It is highly unrealistic to expect people and ISP’s to remember all such information. It
becomes a serious problem when a fine can be imposed or indeed a prison sentence can
be imposed for what in some circumstances is mere forgetfulness and absent-mindedness
as opposed to criminal intent” (Reid, 2001, p. 190).
In 2000, the U.K. was already employing CCTV cameras in major cities, shopping
centers, and residential areas, and the government encouraged their spread through funding and
public statements. CCTV operation generally covers public spaces, although personal CCTV
cameras can capture images on private property and in residential areas, and is covered by the
Data Protection Act of 1998 (DPA) ("Data Protection Act (c. 29)", 1998). There is no warrant
requirement for conducting CCTV surveillance, and anyone can purchase and install a
surveillance camera on their property, including municipalities. Operators must register their
CCTV system with the Information Commissioner, and when doing so, are provided with a list
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of regulations concerning their operation. The Data Protection Act identifies recorded images as
personal data or sensitive person data, and requires that:
“A person must not knowingly or recklessly, without the consent of the data controller—
(a) obtain or disclose personal data or the information contained in personal data, or (b)
procure the disclosure to another person of the information contained in personal data”
("Data Protection Act (c. 29)", 1998).
Once a CCTV operator records personal information, they would be violating the Data
Protection Act by distributing it to a third party, with the exception that disclosure of the
information would prevent or expose criminal activity. With an ever expanding number of
CCTV cameras in the millions in operation, enforcement of these regulations is probably quite
lax. Widespread use of CCTV Nonetheless, the U.K. outlines legal behavior and provides a
regulatory structure to CCTV usage where the U.S. does not. How these policies are
implemented and the scope of such programs may differ greatly, however, and it outside the
realm of this research.
The Terrorism Act of 2000 contains language that allows “any constable in uniform” to
stop any vehicle or pedestrian and “search the vehicle; the driver of the vehicle; a passenger in
the vehicle; anything in or on the vehicle or carried by the driver or a passenger;…the pedestrian;
anything carried by him” as long as (s)he “considers it expedient for the prevention of acts of
terrorism” ("The Terrorism Act 2000 (c. 11)", 2000, s. 44). This clause essentially provides law
enforcement with blanket search and seizure capabilities, as terrorism is broadly defined and
includes acts of “serious violence against a person; [or] involves serious damage to property”
("The Terrorism Act 2000 (c. 11)", 2000). Furthermore, “Under the new measure, a suspected
terrorist can be arrested without a warrant and detained for up to a week without charge”
(CNN.com, 2001). With such a broad definition of terrorism, and suspension of due process, the
act leaves room for misinterpretation and abuse.
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Privacy Protections and Government Regulations in 2006
Several new bills regulating surveillance activities were passed in the U.S. and U.K.
between 2000 and 2006, and are listed in the table below. Following the 9/11 attacks, both the
U.S. and U.K. sought to strengthen internal security by creating or modifying anti-terrorism
laws. The actions authorized under these newer laws will be compared to what was authorized in
the previous section, and the change in privacy protections over time will be evaluated.
Table 2: Laws governing surveillance and privacy 2001-2006
United States
United Kingdom
Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Terrorists Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001
2001
USA PATRIOT Act 2001
Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005
(SOCPA)
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 Identity Cards Act 2006
(IRTPA)
USA PATRIOT and Terrorism Prevention Reauthorization Terrorism Act 2006
Act of 2006

A week after 9/11 the House and Senate passed the Authorization for Use of Military
Force Against Terrorists (AUMF) which provided the president with the “authority under the
Constitution to take action to deter and prevent acts of international terrorism against the United
States” ("Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Terrorists", 2001). While the act does
appear to affect privacy rights, the AUMF was cited by the Bush Administration as the
authorization to conduct warrantless wiretapping of terrorist suspects. “[T]he Bush
administration's argument is that the Authorization for Use of Military Force allows wiretapping
of suspected terrorists without FISA court approval” (Wolly, 2006). Warrantless wiretapping
completely sidesteps FISA laws, and all other relevant privacy protections. This is an ambiguous
issue of both implementation and policy. The Bush administration argued that warrantless
wiretapping was permissible under AUMF since the Act authorizes the president to conduct any
actions he deems necessary to protect the U.S. from terrorism. Congress finds serious fault with
this broad assumption of executive power and completely denies that warrantless wiretapping is
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authorized by AUMF (Wolly, 2006). Regardless, warrantless wiretapping was conducted by the
NSA, authorized by Bush administration officials under this act for a number of years following
the 9/11 attacks. As with ECHELON program, the true scope of the warrantless wiretapping
issue is hard to assess while it remains classified, but it would be unwise to completely ignore it
as the privacy of citizens is affected.
The second major piece of legislation passed in the U.S. after 9/11 was the USA
PATRIOT Act. The PATRIOT Act modified sections of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act (FISA), the Privacy Protection Act of 1980 (PPA), the Cable Communications Policy Act of
1984 (CCPA), The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA), and the Video
Privacy Protection Act of 1988 (VPPA). One of the most sweeping modifications to these acts is
found in Section 215, the ability of investigating government agencies to obtain information
without a warrant about personal purchases, library records, video rental records, business
records, and a host of other records without having to disclose that the information was sought.
The government agencies used National Security Letters (NSLs) to obtain the information and
inform the organization that they were also not allowed to disclose to anyone what information
was provided to the government. The text from this section is provided below:
“An order under this subsection shall not disclose that it is issued for purposes of an
investigation described in subsection (a). No person shall disclose to any other person
(other than those persons necessary to produce the tangible things under this section) that
the Federal Bureau of Investigation has sought or obtained tangible things under this
section. A person who, in good faith, produces tangible things under an order pursuant to
this section shall not be liable to any other person for such production” ("USA PATRIOT
Act", 2001, s. 215).
In addition to stripping the previous privacy protections of the CCPA, ECPA, VPPA, and FISA,
section 215 does not require the investigating agency to apply for a warrant or show probably
cause that the subject under investigation has committed or intends to commit a crime, or inform
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the subject that his or her records have been obtained. This clause also seems to run contrary to
the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement, however deciding the constitutionality of the Act is
outside the scope of this paper. Nonetheless, it seems to disregard even Fourth Amendment
protections, and should be considered a reduction in overall privacy protections.
In addition, the PATRIOT Act expands government investigatory powers to incorporate
what it terms “domestic terrorism” including “activities that involve acts dangerous to human life
that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States” ("USA PATRIOT Act", 2001, s.
802). Suspects of broadly defined domestic terrorism could then be subject to searches and
seizures without a warrant. Searches conducted without warrants, and with delayed notification,
could expand the scope of what is actually searched, as previous laws require warrants to be
targeted at specific items or locations. For these above reasons, the PATRIOT Act significantly
expands the government’s investigatory powers beyond the scope of what was authorized in
2000.
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) also modifies an
important definition of FISA. FISA authorizes broader surveillance of agents of a foreign power
than it does U.S. citizens. A person is considered an agent of a foreign power under FISA when
evidence supports they are working for a foreign power ("The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act", 1978). Title VI of IRTPA modifies this FISA requirement by authorizing surveillance of
‘lone wolf’ terrorists, whose connections to a foreign power cannot be established. This
definition leaves open the possibility that the suspected terrorist could be a U.S. citizen, who
cannot be tied to a foreign power, yet receives the same protections as foreign agent under FISA
("IRTPA", 2004). This expansion further lowers the wall between foreign and domestic
intelligence gathering activities, and reduces privacy protections under FISA.
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In March of 2006, Congress reauthorized most sections of the PATRIOT Act. The
reauthorization did repeal some of the above provisions, including the gag order surrounding
national security letters (NSLs), and the ‘roving wiretap’ provision that allowed the government
to wiretap any phone an individual had access to (CNN.com, 2006). It also granted further
oversight by requiring that the FBI report to Congress the ways in which the PATRIOT Act’s
powers were being used. President Bush issued a signing statement after the reauthorization in
which he declared the Executive branch free to act under AUMF and “his constitutional authority
to bypass a law” he deemed prohibitive of his ability to secure the nation against terrorist activity
(Savage, 2006). So while Congress authorized a redacted a modest amount of investigatory
powers, the Bush administration asserted that such protections may not apply to executive
actions. Again, this may fall under implementation of the law, and not the actual policy changes.
However, if the president authorized cabinet levels agencies such as the FBI to ignore even the
slight amount of privacy protections Congress provided under the reauthorization, this would
have an impact on overall privacy protections. Regardless, the reauthorization of the PATRIOT
Act still included most of the provisions of the 2001 bill which decreased overall privacy
protections since 2000.
The U.K. also passed major legislation following the attacks on 9/11 which expanded law
enforcement capabilities. The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 authorized law
enforcement to obtain fingerprints, search, and photograph a person detained as a suspected
terrorist if it “will facilitate the ascertainment of that person’s identity; and that person has
refused to identify himself or the officer has reasonable grounds for suspecting that that person is
not who he claims to be” ("Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (c. 24)", 2001, Part
10). The Act further permits law enforcement to stop and search any person or vehicle at any
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time they feel “incidents involving serious violence may take place” and seize any item “he has
reasonable grounds for suspecting to be an offensive weapon” even without charging the
detainee with a crime ("Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (c. 24)", 2001, Part 10).
This goes beyond previous privacy protections as the detainee does not actually have to be
charged with a crime in order to be fingerprinted, photographed or searched, or a warrant
provided to search and seize items.
In addition, Part 11 of the Act requires telecommunications providers to retain all
communications data for a period of two years “for the purpose of safeguarding national
security; or for the purposes of prevention or detection of crime or the prosecution of offenders
which may relate directly or indirectly to national security” ("Anti-Terrorism, Crime and
Security Act 2001 (c. 24)", 2001, Part 11). Such communications data would then be available
for the government if and when an investigation took place. By requiring that
telecommunications providers retain personal communications data, the government is basically
authorizing pen register devices on all communications devices in the event that they may be
needed at an unspecified time. This is clearly an expansion over the investigatory powers
allowed in 2000, and decreases privacy protections covering communications within the U.K.
In 2005, the parliament passed the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act (SOCPA),
which gave law enforcement new capabilities to arrest, detain and remove persons suspected of
offenses, and new powers to search multiple premises, possibly an unlimited number of times.
Law enforcement gained the ability to:
“arrest without a warrant— anyone who is about to commit an offence; anyone who is in
the act of committing an offence; anyone whom he has reasonable grounds for suspecting
to be about to commit an offence; anyone whom he has reasonable grounds for
suspecting to be committing an offence” ("Serious Organised Crime and Police Act",
2005, Part 3).
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SOCPA also allows law enforcement to remove people from any “place if [law enforcement]
believes, on reasonable grounds, that the person is in the place at a time when he would be
prohibited from entering it” ("Serious Organised Crime and Police Act", 2005). Exclusionary
zones were implemented around public buildings, including parliament, and peaceful protesters
were forcibly removed, thereby curtailing their ability to congregate, and subjecting them to the
other powers authorized under SOCPA if they refused. Furthermore, under the Act law
enforcement is only required to obtain one warrant to search multiple premises the subject of the
search may be affiliated with and if the warrant “authorises multiple entries, the number of
entries authorised may be unlimited, or limited to a maximum” ("Serious Organised Crime and
Police Act", 2005, Part 3). Previously, British law required that search warrants specify a person
or premises to be searched, but under SOCPA, a warrant may be issued to search multiple
premises an unlimited number of times.
SOCPA also expands powers authorized in the Anti-Terrorism and Security Act by
allowing detainees suspected of criminal offenses, not necessarily terrorist offenses, to be
fingerprinted, photographed, and adds that detainees can now have an “impression taken of
[their] footwear” even if they are not charged with a crime ("Serious Organised Crime and Police
Act", 2005, Part 3). SOCPA powers decrease privacy protections against unwarranted searches,
seizures, and detentions, and expand the scope of warranted searches and seizures over 2000
levels.
In 2006, parliament passed the Identity Cards Act which established “a register of
individuals (to be known as “the National Identity Register”)” ("Identity Cards Act", 2006). The
purpose of the National Identity Register is to maintain a database of personal information
including:
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“the address of every other place in the United Kingdom or elsewhere where he has a
place of residence; where in the United Kingdom and elsewhere he has previously been
resident; the times at which he was resident at different places in the United Kingdom or
elsewhere; his current residential status; residential statuses previously held by him;
information about numbers allocated to him for identification purposes and about the
documents to which they relate; information about occasions on which information
recorded about him in the Register has been provided to any person; and information
recorded in the Register at his request; his full name; other names by which he is or has
previously been known; his gender; his date and place of birth and, if he has died, the
date of his death; and external characteristics of his that are capable of being used for
identifying him; his nationality; his entitlement to remain in the United Kingdom; and
where that entitlement derives from a grant of leave to enter or remain in the United
Kingdom, the terms and conditions of that leave” ("Identity Cards Act", 2006, 1).
Additionally, a person with an ID card must “allow his fingerprints, and other biometric
information about himself, to be taken and recorded; to allow himself to be photographed”
("Identity Cards Act", 2006). Such a broad amount of information would be stored on every
person in the U.K. and kept in a centralized database, and registration in the National ID Card
Registry is compulsory. Implications for privacy protection are substantial, however. Innocent
citizens required to give detailed residency histories, biometric information, and other sensitive
personal information on one card face revealing these details about themselves to not only the
government,

but

also

potential

employers,

schools,

doctors,

insurance

agencies,

telecommunications providers, banks, libraries, and other organizations which require ID cards
in order to process applications, loans, or services.
Following the July 7th, 2005 attacks on the subway and transportation system in London,
parliament enacted the Terrorism Act in March 2006. The Terrorism Act further augmented law
enforcement capabilities by criminalizing encouragement of terrorism, the dissemination of
terrorist publications, training for terrorism, and by allowing the detention of terrorist suspects
for up to 90 days without a charge ("The Terrorism Act", 2006). The 90 day detention was
reduced to 28 days after the bill had initially passed, during one of the review sessions. The Act
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also authorized “all premises warrants” which permit law enforcement the ability to search any
and all premises occupied by a suspect without “specify[ing] in the application all the premises
which the person so specified occupies or controls and which might need to be searched” ("The
Terrorism Act", 2006, Part 2). Additionally, a warrant can be issued “to enter and search the
premises; and to seize anything found there which the constable has reason to believe is” a
terrorist publication ("The Terrorism Act", 2006, Part 2). Without clarification of what a terrorist
publication entails, possessing controversial reading material could potentially be an offense
capable of eliciting a search and seizure. Outside of issues concerning freedom of speech, this
authorizes access to private residences based solely on reading the wrong books, articles or
websites. Search and seizure capabilities are further extended to law enforcement to search any
vehicle, the operator of any vehicle, and the crew located within the “‘internal waters’… in the
United Kingdom that are not comprised in any police area” ("The Terrorism Act", 2006, Part 2).
While the U.S. and the U.K. both expanded search, seizure, and surveillance capabilities
after the 9/11 attacks, the evidence above suggests that the U.K. was far more comprehensive in
its expansion of law enforcement powers, and by consequence, less protective of privacy rights.
Based on deviations from the status quo, the U.K. enacted legislation authorizing broader police
powers. Again, both countries widened the scope of search and seizure provisions, and wiretap
procedures, but the U.S. retracted two of the more controversial provisions of the PATRIOT Act
legislation towards the end of the time period, the roving wiretap provision and the gag order
surrounding NSLs. In comparison, the U.K. consecutively passed legislation expanding
investigatory powers, with no revision in successive legislation5. This appears to be in
accordance with the central hypothesis that the institutional structure affects policy outcomes,

5

The reduction of the detention period did not require additional legislation, but was changed during a review of the
legislation.
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and specifically that a smaller (larger) number of veto points allows for more (less) deviations
from the status quo.
Privacy Protection and Institutional Variations
The previous section analyzed the changes in privacy protections over time, evidenced by
the deviations from the status quo, defined herein as the year 2000. Both the U.S. and U.K.
created policies which modified and/or expanded the investigatory powers of law enforcement
and government agencies. Do institutional variations across the U.S. and U.K. explain the policy
outcomes evidenced in the previous section? The veto points literature argues that “the policy
stability of a political system increases when the number of veto players increases, [and] when
their congruence decreases” (Tsebelis, 1999, p. 322). It follows that policy change would
increase when the number of veto players decreases, and when their preferences converge. Do
the U.S. and U.K. exhibit these characteristics during the time period specified, and if so, is that
evidentiary of a relationship between institutional structure and policy change. If not, what other
possible explanations exist for the policy outcomes experienced in these countries? The
following sections endeavor to thoroughly answer these questions.
Institutional Structure in the U.S.
The 2000 general election in the U.S. produced a Republican president, George W. Bush,
a slight Republican majority in the House of Representatives, and an evenly split Senate. There
was a substantial electoral crisis following the presidential election, which eventually led to
Bush’s certification as the 43rd President of the United States.
“The way in which George W. Bush won the White House certainly makes it harder for
him to deliver on his campaign promise to "be a uniter, not a divider." But even without
that burden, any president would face a formidable challenge in trying to govern in
harness with a Congress so evenly and sharply divided by party as the one elected in
2000, especially when the partisan divisions are so firmly rooted in the parties' respective
electoral constituencies” (Jacobson, 2001, p. 25).
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To add fuel to the partisan fire, in May of 2001, Senator James Jeffords (R) Vermont, switched
his party affiliation to Independent and announced he would caucus with the Democrats, giving
them a slim majority (Conniff, 2001). The 9/11 attacks placed these partisan sentiments on hold.
The U.S. experienced a period of marked preference convergence following the attacks on 9/11.
If the House and Senate had been bitterly and closely divided in August 2001, they were
definitely not so following the attacks. The House and Senate voted to pass the AUMF 420-0 and
98-0, respectively, and the USA PATRIOT Act 357-66 and 98-1, respectively.
The sudden and dramatic shift in public and partisan sentiment has been attributed to the
“‘rally 'round the flag’ phenomenon [which] is well documented in the political science
literature, and Bush's surge in public opinion constitutes a quintessential rally” (Schubert,
Stewart, & Curran, 2002, p. 559). A profound convergence in veto player preferences such as
this would create an opportunity for policy changes, and passage of the PATRIOT Act. As far as
the institutional literature is concerned, whether or not this convergence was the result of the
rally effect, or some other variable, the result would still be a preference profile likely to consent
to policy change, which it ultimately did.
The U.S. experienced another convergence in preferences during the 2002 mid-term
elections when the Republicans gained majority control in both houses of Congress. The
Republican electoral victory and subsequent control of Congress and the Presidency presents
another situation where veto points are controlled by veto players with similar preferences and
internal cohesion. These sentiments continued during the 2004 re-election of Bush, the
solidifying of the Republican majority in the House, and the slim majority of Republicans in the
Senate. Preference convergence was never as high as immediately following 9/11; however it
appears to still be significant. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
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passed with wide bi-partisan support, passing the House 336-75, and the Senate 89-2.
Interestingly, a bi-partisan effort successfully derailed the reauthorization of the PATRIOT Act
with a threatened filibuster in 2005, even though the veto points in the U.S. were still majority
controlled by the Republican Party (Stolberg, 2006).
“In a letter Thursday, a bipartisan group of six senators said the tentative deal had caused
them "deep concern" because it did not go far enough in "making reasonable changes to
the original law to protect innocent people from unnecessary and intrusive government
surveillance." The group called for tighter restrictions on the government's ability to
demand records and its use of so-called "sneak and peak" warrants to conduct secret
searches without immediately informing the target, among other measures” (Lichtblau,
2005).
Instead of making all provisions of the Patriot Act permanent, the Senators argued they should
sunset in four years, allowing for additional review by the legislation. Once these revisions were
implemented, the bill passed a resounding 89-10 in the Senate, and 280-138 in the House
(Bacon, 2006). It appears that on issues of national security, acceptable policy outcome
preferences remained quite similar across parties. Given the devastating nature of the 9/11
attacks, and the subsequent expansion of the security apparatus of the state, it is not surprising
that issues of national security, including law enforcement capabilities, would result in veto
player preference convergences, even among previously bitterly divided partisan actors. It would
be interesting to analyze if the preference convergence noted on these national security issues
extended to other issues, or if it is simply a product of heightened security concerns.
Institutional Structure in the U.K.
The U.K. government during this time period was controlled by Prime Minister Tony
Blair and the Labour Party, which he brought to a resounding victory in 1997. Blair swept the
Labour Party into power with bold initiatives, promises of reform and enjoyed an above average
popularity with the British people, at least until the invasion of Iraq in 2003 ("The great
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performer leaves the stage." 2007). With a singular veto point the institutional literature predicts
that policy changes are quite likely. Due to Blair’s landslide victory and the widespread
popularity of the Labour Party, the effects of the informal veto points were weakened. Based on
evidence from the previous section, over the 2000 to 2006 time period, the U.K. did produce
several major pieces of legislation that deviated from the status quo.
Under the Labour Party and Tony Blair, the U.K. passed four major successive pieces of
legislation affecting privacy protections. While all of the measures were opposed by members of
the opposition parties and the House of Lords, the Acts were still passed, albeit sometimes with
minor concessions (Millar, 2002; , "Terror detention law 'must go'", 2004; Travis, 2004; Ward,
2002). The Iraqi invasion in 2003 dramatically weakened Blair’s position, within his party and in
public opinion of his leadership. Blair’s popularity waned following Britain’s cooperation in the
Iraq war, and he faced a growing backbench rebellion, culminating in MPs calling for his
departure in 2006. Despite these factors, the Labour Party was still capable of passing the
Terrorism Act of 2006 ("Backbench mood darkens over Blair's departure", 2006). Of all the Acts
passed since RIPA, the Terrorism Act of 2006 broadens the most government search and seizure
capabilities, and introduces criminal charges for broadly defined terrorist publications. While the
House of Commons eventually reduced the amount of time a terrorist suspect could be held
without charge from 90 days to 28 days, this minor compromise does not seem to reflect the
inner turmoil over party leadership.
According to the veto points literature, conditions in both the U.S. and U.K. were
favorable for policy changes to occur. In the U.S., policy outcomes during the time period when
the House and Senate were controlled by different parties represent a dramatic preference
convergence between to Democrats and Republicans which manifests itself in national security
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issues post 9/11. It does not appear that the ideological proximity of actors greatly influenced
policy outcomes, however. Democrats voted similarly to Republicans on all of the legislation
expanding law enforcement powers, despite their ideological differences. The major pieces of
legislation passed from 2001-2006 were all approved by bi-partisan majorities, with few
Democrats opposing legislation. While partisan politics may have played a major role in other
facets of government policy, where law enforcement capabilities and national security were
concerned, ideological differences appear to have taken a back seat. Without a strong minority
party, major party defections or a coalition government, the U.K. system remains open to policy
changes as the Prime Minister and his/her party see fit. Strong reactions after the 9/11 attacks
and 7/7 bombings most likely contributed to the ease of passage of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and
Security Act as well as the Terrorism Act of 2006. However, the lack of meaningful checks on
executive power in Britain appears to give the Prime Minister and his/her party a clear path to
create and implement new legislation.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
Terrorism as a method of violent expression became popular among domestic and
international dissident groups in during nationalist, leftists, and anti-war movements of the
1960’s. Both the U.K. and the U.S. reacted in the 60’s by increasing surveillance and information
gathering on dissident groups. There was a significant backlash in the 1970’s as some of the
methods of surveillance and covert operations were exposed, resulting in the improved privacy
protection laws. However, terrorist events beginning in the 1990’s and leading up to 9/11 created
an environment where national security was seen as the most important issue facing the modern
national state. As the focus of the state swings towards the security apparatus, it is important to
understand how privacy protections and the police powers of the state expand and contract. This
research thus far has shown that institutional variation across the U.S. and U.K affects privacy
protections.
The cases of the United States and United Kingdom between 2000 and 2006 have been
examined, finding that both countries expanded their law enforcement capabilities and reduced
previously held privacy protections. In the case of the U.S., the September 11th attacks created an
environment where there was clear bi-partisan support for increasing law enforcement
capabilities, and the effect appears to last well into 2006, based on bi-partisan support for law
enforcement enhancing legislation. Where partisan politics may have been an important factor in
other legislative areas, it appears they did not significantly affect voting on the major bills
approved post 9/11 that dealt with investigatory powers. In the case of the U.K., both the 9/11
and 7/7 terrorist attacks prompted increased state focus on security and law enforcement
capabilities.
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The institutional literature suggests that policy change is related to the number of veto
points and preferences of veto players involved in policy making. The U.S. has a greater number
of veto points than the U.K., and although national security threats produced preference
convergence among the veto players, the policy changes reducing privacy protections were
arguably narrower in scope than those in the case of the U.K. Tentatively, this is in line with the
expectation that the U.K. would be able to push through more legislation affecting privacy
protections. Evidently, while both states push through the same amount of legislation, the scope
of the expansion of law enforcement powers is arguably greater in the U.K. In the U.K., policy
changes decreased privacy protections against unwarranted searches, seizures, and detentions,
and expanded the scope of warranted searches and seizures to include multiple locations and
possible unlimited access. Furthermore, U.K. communications interception capabilities went
beyond U.S. laws on two key points. Firstly, they require telecommunications providers to retain
communications data for up to two years, and secondly they criminalize the act of not providing
passwords or encryption keys to government agencies, even when such information is not
withheld due to criminal intent.
Further investigation is needed post-2006, as after this time period both countries
experienced a change in leadership. Tony Blair was replaced as Prime Minister following
prominent backbench rebellions concerned with his competency to run the government, and in
2008 the U.S. electorate responded to the Bush administration’s tenure by handing the
Democrats a resounding victory and control of Congress and the presidency. With the U.K. still
under Labour Party control, albeit with much reduced popularity, and the U.S. institutions
controlled by ideologically similar actors, it would be interesting to investigate if there is a
reversal of policies. A reversal could occur, if that is the intention of the new administrations.
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The public opinion backlash in the U.S. represented by the overwhelming election of Democrats
could signal that the expansion of law enforcement capabilities is no longer popular.
Obama’s record is mixed on whether or not he would support increased privacy
protections based on a controversial vote in the Senate “extending the power of the executive
branch to authorize warrantless interception of international communications, and effectively
granting retroactive amnesty to telecoms that participated in the extralegal surveillance program
authorized by President George Bush after the attacks of 9/11” (Sanchez, 2008). In addition, the
Supreme Court also signaled that widespread policy change is unlikely. In early 2008, the Court
“turned down an appeal from the American Civil Liberties Union to let it pursue a lawsuit
against the [warrantless wiretapping] program that began shortly after the Sept. 11 terror attacks”
("Supreme Court Rejects ACLU Challenge to Warrantless Surveillance Program", 2008). More
recently, the Obama administration approved tighter restrictions on national security letters
(NSLs) imposed by a federal appeals court, which “w[ould] force the FBI to justify to a judge the
gag orders that it routinely slaps on the targets of NSLs” (Stokes, 2009). While strengthening
some privacy protections, but not others, it remains unclear if the new administration will favor
widespread policy change.
Prime Minister Gordon Brown’s record is a bit more straightforward with regard to law
enforcement capabilities. Brown has consistently defended the legislation passed under the Blair
administration, of which he was a part. In a speech to the Institute for Public Policy Research in
2008
“Brown accepted the proposals for an annual debate on the UK’s surveillance apparatus –
at least where it involves CCTV - the rest of [his] speech was a defence of CCTV and the
other technologies which prompted the committee to consider whether the UK is indeed
sleepwalking into being a surveillance society in the first place” (Fay, 2008).
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Other reports suggest that Prime Minister Brown is considering expanding surveillance beyond
the legislation authorized in 2006. In 2008,
“British newspapers reported that Prime Minister Gordon Brown's government was
working on a plan to monitor every phone call, Web-site visit, text message and email in
the country, entering the information into a vast database that would be used to catch
terrorists, pedophiles and scam artists” (Sullum, 2009, p. A15).
Given the institutional structure in the U.K., and the preferences of the executive to maintain or
expand law enforcement powers, it is likely that the U.K. may experience a further reduction in
privacy protections.
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